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Reviewed by Michael C. Dorf
With Learned Hand and Henry Friendly, Richard Posner is one of the three 
greatest lower federal court judges in American history. Hand and Friendly 
occasionally wrote important extrajudicial texts,1 but they made their marks 
chiefl y through their work on the bench. By contrast, Posner’s reputation 
rests at least as much on his early academic writings in what was then the 
nascent law-and-economics movement and his role as a public intellectual 
since becoming a judge. Posner’s extracurricular work over the last quarter-
century has addressed diverse subjects—including sex,2 literature,3 and national 
security4—but the dominant leitmotif of his recent writing is legal realism. 5 
Judges cannot, should not, and do not decide appellate cases by applying 
formal legal materials to concrete disputes, Posner argues. He insists that 
judges quite properly seek pragmatic, sensible resolutions to legal disputes.
Posner’s latest book—Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary 6—wraps 
Posner’s pragmatic view of judging in the shell of a diagnosis and prescription. 
First he tells the reader what he thinks are the main challenges facing federal 
courts: Posner thinks that too many judges either believe or pretend to believe 
in formalism, and that they passively rely on the adversary system to provide 
information it does not reliably supply. He also thinks that the courts are 
managed poorly. Then Posner suggests ways in which legal scholarship and 
1. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? 
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise 
of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1994).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE (3d ed. 2009).
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT (2006).
5. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY (2016).
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education could be reformed to help address these problems: More legal 
scholars should study how courts and judges actually conduct their business, 
while collaborating on research projects with judges; legal education should 
give students a clear-eyed view of how law is made and applied, and it should 
be more practical.
That’s merely a summary of a summary. Posner himself summarizes his 
diagnosis and prescription in a bullet-point list that covers seven pages.7 The 
book itself contains still more. It rewards reading. Divergent Paths is enormously 
entertaining and contains numerous nuggets of sound, practical wisdom.
The book also displays Posner’s basic decency. Although he was best known 
early in his career for coldly endorsing the impersonal logic of the market as 
a means of solving nearly all social problems,8 during his time on the bench 
Posner has rounded into a compassionate judge. For example, a twenty-fi ve-
page appendix titled “The Tragedy of Supervised Release” very eff ectively 
criticizes the federal practice of sentencing convicted defendants to terms and 
conditions of supervised release before they serve their prison time. Posner 
highlights the hardships and injustices this approach visits on off enders 
upon their release.9 In addition, an epilogue dissecting three recent Supreme 
Court cases decries the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice John Roberts in 
Obergefell v. Hodges10 as “heartless.”11 The judge who, more than almost anyone, 
brought the dismal science into law12 has come around to the view of Justice 
Harry Blackmun that “compassion need not be exiled from the province of 
judging.”13
Yet for all of its strengths, Divergent Paths is a problematic book. Some of 
its diffi  culties are stylistic. Posner repeatedly criticizes various judges and 
academics for poor writing, but, even as the book reads beautifully from 
paragraph to paragraph, it does not hang together. As Paul Horwitz observed 
in an insightful online review, “the book needed more ruthless editing and 
greater self-restraint.”14
7. Id. at 362-68.
8. Most controversially, Posner applied market logic to address the “baby shortage.” See 
Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987); Elisabeth 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 
(1978).
9. See POSNER DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 197-221.
10. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
11. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 394.
12. Honorable mention goes to Learned Hand, United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (off ering a cost-benefi t formula for determining negligence), and to 
Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. 
REV. 713 (1965) (assessing accident law in economic terms).
13. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting).
14. Paul Horwitz, The Roads Not Taken, NEW RAMBLER (Jan. 18, 2016), http://newramblerreview.
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Divergent Paths also has a cranky feel, with Posner taking potshots based 
on his pet peeves. These include long opinions and articles, the Bluebook, 
student-edited law journals, the pretentiousness of much legal writing (such 
as unnecessary uses of Latin), and even spelling errors.15 Despite Posner’s 
praiseworthy generosity toward the relatively powerless litigants whose cases 
come before him, he can be petty toward his peers on the bench and in the 
academy.
So far as the substance of Posner’s diagnosis and prescription is concerned, 
Divergent Paths knocks on an open door. Posner off ers the academy advice on 
how to combat formalism, but he does not recognize the extent to which his 
own views—legal realism and pragmatism—are already widely accepted in legal 
scholarship and pedagogy. Posner’s goal appears to be to banish all vestiges 
of formalism, but he does not off er reasons to think that his eff orts along these 
lines will succeed when over a century of legal realism has failed. Moreover, as 
I explain below, his key proposals for the reform of legal scholarship and legal 
education are inconsistent with one another.
I
Posner places great faith in frankness. For example, he insists that his law 
clerks call him by fi rst name and treat him as a peer.16 This approach leads to 
uninhibited constructive criticism of Posner’s work product of the sort that 
a judge who surrounds himself with sycophants does not receive. By bluntly 
criticizing the work of other judges and scholars, Posner likewise aims to 
improve their output.
I doubt that Posner’s frank criticism of his colleagues on the bench will 
make them better judges or bring them over to Posner’s way of thinking. 
Certainly Posner’s pointed criticisms of Justice Antonin Scalia during the last 
years of Scalia’s life17 did nothing to turn Scalia into a Posner-style legal realist. 
On the contrary, they predictably led to counterattacks by Scalia’s defenders.18
com/book-reviews/law/the-roads-not-taken (review of POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 
6). 
15. Posner laments the frequent misspelling of “minimis” as “minimus” in the Latin phrase de 
minimis non curat lex. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 123. Yet on the same page on 
which appears this petty criticism regarding spelling in a mostly dead language, Posner 
himself makes an error regarding a language that hundreds of millions of people still speak 
in their daily lives. He uses the word “Hindu” (a religion) where he ought to have used the 
word “Hindi” (a language). Id. No one is perfect, and Posner’s peevishness undermines his 
more serious points.
16. Id. at 372-73.
17. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-
reading-the-law-textual-originalism (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW (2012)).
18. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  E d w a rd  W h e l a n  a u t h o re d  a  s e r i e s  o f  b l o g  p o s t s  o n  t h e  N a t i o n a l 
Review Online vigorously defending Scalia and Garner against Posner’s charges. The 
f i r s t  p os t ,  w i th  l inks  to  the  subsequent  p os t s  and  to  some  o f  Posner ’ s  rep l i e s , 
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That is not to say that Posner’s arguments against other judges are wrong. 
Even if they ultimately prove unpersuasive, Posner’s criticisms of formalist 
judging rest on a solid foundation of legal realism and political science.19 
Selection bias makes ideology and values—what Posner calls “priors”20—
especially important in Supreme Court adjudication, but even at the federal 
appeals courts, the costs of litigation (except for pro se litigants proceeding in 
forma pauperis) will ensure that, in most cases presented for decision, respectable 
arguments can be made for either side.
Posner says that in such cases he fi rst attempts to ascertain what the best 
resolution of the dispute should be, all things considered, and then looks 
to see whether the formal legal materials block that result.21 He thinks that 
other judges often tacitly do something similar and that everyone would be 
better off  if judges frankly employed the same procedure he uses, instead of 
pretending (sometimes even to themselves) that they derive an answer from 
the precedents and other legal texts as such.
Posner off ers candor as the chief virtue of his legal realist approach.22 Yet 
candor has its limits. Consider Scott Altman’s response to similar calls for 
candor by the critical legal studies heirs to legal realism. Altman accepted that 
judges should not consciously lie about the grounds for their decisions, but 
he worried that too much introspection into the grounds for their decisions 
would loosen useful inhibitions that constrain them, and thus serve important 
rule-of-law values.23
Posner does not address Altman’s argument, but if he did, he would almost 
certainly reject it, because Posner does not place much value on constraining 
judges per se. Constraints get in the way of the judge’s all-things-considered 
best judgment about how to resolve disputes. Moreover, Posner views most 
supposed sources of constraint as mere mystifi cation. He uses the term legal 
realism in both a descriptive and a prescriptive sense, and the prescription 
follows from the description. For Posner, because judges cannot help but 
decide reasonably close cases according to their priors, they should simply be 
honest about doing so.
No doubt these claims will be contested by judges and scholars more 
sympathetic to formalism than Posner is, but there is less at stake in this contest 
than meets the eye. Posner’s preferred method for deciding cases reverses the 
usual order of operations, but it preserves the customary elements. He does 
i s  E d w a r d  W h e l a n ,  R i c h a rd  A .  P o s n e r ’ s  B a d l y  C o n f u s e d  A t t a c k  o n  S c a l i a / G a r n e r , 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 7, 2012), http://eppc.org/publications/richard-a-posnera
%C2%80%C2%99s-badly-confused-attack-on-scaliagarner/#PosnerPart1.
19. See infra notes 45-47.
20. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 17.
21. Id. at 78, 81, 85.
22. Id. at 182 n.150 (citing David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 
(1987)).
23. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 297 (1990).
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not say that judges can or should disregard authoritative texts, and while 
he expresses general disdain for precedent as a guide to adjudication on the 
ground that it looks to the past rather than to future consequences, he invokes 
only the conventional grounds for thinking a precedent should be overruled: 
if it “is demonstrably erroneous[] and has not generated substantial reliance 
interests . . . .”24
Posner’s views about statutes are also conventional. He says a judge facing a 
diffi  cult statutory question completes the “statutory project that the legislature 
began”25 by plugging holes; thus, he pictures “judges not as interpreters of 
legislation but as partners of the legislators.”26 This too is old hat. As Posner 
acknowledges, his approach to statutory cases is “a version of purposivism,”27 
which is more or less what he learned as a law student over fi ve decades ago.28
Posner’s account of the nonmanagerial problems in the federal courts makes 
up more than a third of Divergent Paths. Although he titles the long chapter 
setting out these problems “Process Defi ciencies,” it is a substantive critique of 
conventional judging. At the end of the day, however, Posner’s own pragmatic 
legal realism is more conventional than he appears to realize. Posner is a sheep 
in wolf’s clothing.
II
By contrast with Posner’s seemingly fi erce but ultimately mild critique of 
how other judges decide cases, his attack on legal scholarship really is ferocious. 
To be sure, a prominent federal judge lamenting the state of legal scholarship 
would be appropriately greeted by a yawn or a sigh, were the complainant 
almost anyone other than Posner, who is, after all, still very much “one of 
us.” Yet Posner recounts and seemingly adopts the now-familiar complaints 
lodged by other judges, especially Harry Edwards,29 that legal scholars mostly 
write theoretical esoterica for one another rather than grounded articles to 
24. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 401. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 
(1991) (listing occasions justifying departures from precedent, including “when governing 
decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned” and when reliance interests are not involved.).
25. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 113.
26. Id. at 112.
27. Id. at 289.
28. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111-1380 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds. 1994) (elaborating purposivist approach to statutory cases in materials that were used 
to teach Harvard Law School students in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Posner was 
enrolled).
29. See Harry T. Edwards, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to Law Reviews, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 1483 (2014); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). In my view, Judge Edwards does not off er persuasive 
evidence in support of his claims. See Michael Dorf, Judge Harry Edwards is Still Unimpressed 
with Legal Scholarship, DORF ON LAW (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/12/judge-
harry-edwards-is-still.html.
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aid the bench. Chief Justice John Roberts encapsulated what has become the 
conventional wisdom among judges disaff ected with legal scholarship when 
he said this in 2011: “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the fi rst 
article is likely to be, you know, the infl uence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary 
approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something.”30
Posner is not the same kind of anti-intellectual as most of the other judges 
who disdain legal scholarship, but he is an anti-intellectual nonetheless. Posner 
is an intellectual’s anti-intellectual, reminiscent of the late nineteenth-/early 
twentieth-century pragmatists—especially Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whom 
Posner so admires. With William James, Posner is impatient with abstract 
questions that have no practical cash value.31
To state the obvious rejoinder, legal scholarship can have value even if 
judges fi nd it unhelpful in deciding concrete cases. Academic writing has many 
audiences, depending on the topic, methodology, and author. We write for 
legislators, regulatory agencies, practicing lawyers, students, scholars in other 
fi elds, the general public, and yes, one another. Some of the writing for each 
of these audiences focuses on narrow questions, some on broader questions; 
some uses conventional doctrinal tools, some uses various empirical methods, 
and some uses theory; some scholarship is good, some bad.
Posner provides very weak evidence for even his narrow contention. The 
claim that legal scholarship is too theoretical to be helpful to the judiciary 
cannot be proved by showing that there is some or even a great deal of legal 
scholarship that judges fi nd too abstract to be helpful. Given the enormous 
volume of legal scholarship—a website that ranks law journals lists over 
850 of them32—it is possible for there to be far too much of just about any 
imaginable kind of legal scholarship without any complementary shortage of 
any other kind of legal scholarship. Despite his admiration for quantitative 
empirical work, Posner makes no eff ort to quantify the volume of existing 
legal scholarship that is valuable to the judiciary.
30. Orin Kerr quotes the Chief Justice in his tongue-in-cheek eff ort to determine the answer to 
the question the latter thought might interest the professoriate. See Orin S. Kerr, The Infl uence 
of Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251, 251 n.1 (2015). For 
a more biting response, see David Pozen, The Infl uence of Juridical Cant on Edifi catory Approaches in 
21st-Century America, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2015).
31. James tells a charming story about a question regarding a squirrel. Trying to get a good look 
at a squirrel on a tree, the man walks around the tree, but the squirrel meanwhile changes 
positions on the tree. Does the man go around the squirrel? James says the answer depends 
on why one wants to know. See William James, What Pragmatism Means (originally published 
in 1907), in PRAGMATISM 93, 93-94 (Louis Menand ed. 1997). Generalizing, James contends 
that one ought to resolve questions by asking “[w]hat diff erence would it practically make to 
anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?” Id. at 94.
32. Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2008-2015, WASH. & LEE UNIV. SCH. L., L. LIBRARY, 
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2016). The website allows the user to fi lter by 
various methods. Searching for only English-language U.S. law journals that appear in print 
produces a list of 840 journals. Id. Adding online journals brings the tally to 931. Id. Adding 
foreign English-language law journals produces a list with more than 1500 entries. Id. 
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Posner’s method is instead anecdotal, but even then he chooses odd targets. 
He especially disdains constitutional theory, singling out Laurence Tribe and 
Akhil Amar for special ridicule.33 Yet Tribe is not chiefl y a theorist. He built his 
reputation as a fi rst-class constitutional scholar by writing a treatise,34 the kind 
of work that Posner describes as most valued by judges.35 Further, although 
Tribe takes doctrine more seriously than Posner does, he is no formalist. Amar, 
meanwhile, is essentially a historian of the Constitution, whose chief interest 
is its history outside the courts. One can see why such work might not interest 
a judge looking for guidance in deciding concrete cases, but that hardly 
warrants Posner’s harsh evaluation of Amar’s oeuvre. Furthermore, many 
judges call themselves originalists, and are thus intensely interested in Amar’s 
(sometimes surprising) historical discoveries. Even judges and scholars who 
eschew originalism typically think that pre- and post-enactment history of a 
constitutional provision has some relevance to its contemporary application.36 
If Amar’s work is unhelpful to Posner, that does not mean it is unhelpful to all 
or even most judges.
Posner complains about the work of Amar and Tribe the way that someone 
who went to a Bruno Mars concert might complain that Mars and his band 
performed funk rather than opera. What did he expect? Divergent Paths gives no 
indication that Posner grappled at all with how audiences other than judges—
or even audiences of judges not named Richard Posner—might fi nd Tribe’s 
and Amar’s work useful or interesting. 
Posner’s drive-by criticisms of Tribe and Amar are unwarranted, but his 
treatment of Richard Fallon is inexcusable. Posner’s chief examples of the 
33. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 277 (deriding “the fl ights of fancy of such 
constitutional gurus as Laurence Tribe and Akhil Amar”); id. at 284 & n.32 (describing a 
recent book by Amar as chiefl y intended “to demonstrate the ingenuity of the author”) 
(citing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012)); id. at 33 n.32 
(asserting that some of the “scholarship”—which Posner places in scare quotes—of Tribe 
“would strike most judges as frivolous, even narcissistic”) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE 
INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008)).
34. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). A widely used second edition 
was published in 1988, and a volume of a projected two-volume third edition was published 
in 1999. In 2005, Tribe decided to forgo work on the second volume and has been out of the 
treatise-writing business since. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 Green Bag 2d 291 
(2005). He has not, however, stopped writing about the work of the federal courts, see, e.g., 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE (2014), and his treatise continues 
to be widely cited by federal appeals courts. See, e.g., Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 759 F.3d 1186, 1188 
(10th Cir. 2014) (Hartz, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review) (citing third edition 
of Tribe’s treatise); United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing second edition); 
Connelly v. Steel Valley School Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing fi rst and second 
editions).
35. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 32.
36. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original 
Meaning, 15 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (“virtually all practitioners of and commentators 
on constitutional law accept that original meaning has some relevance to constitutional 
interpretation.”). 
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supposed worthlessness of theory are two articles by Fallon,37 whom Posner 
calls his “whipping boy.”38 Singling out Fallon is grossly unfair. His books 
and articles have been cited by federal courts on numerous occasions. Indeed, 
in less than the fi ve years before the publication of Divergent Paths, three of 
Posner’s own opinions cited various works by Fallon.39 True, Posner thinks 
citations of academic writings in judicial opinions are typically inserted by law 
clerks for their ornamental value, without playing a causal role in the judge’s 
decision,40 but he levels this criticism at other judges. Presumably Posner himself, 
who drafts his own opinions, cites only legal scholarship that he deems actually 
helpful.
Perhaps Posner is right that the two Fallon articles he ridicules will lack 
infl uence on courts, but again, so what? The Fallon excerpts that Posner 
quotes are not even typical of Fallon’s infl uence on Posner, much less of the 
infl uence of legal scholarship in general on the federal judiciary overall, to 
say nothing of the relation between legal scholarship and the legal system as 
a whole.
III
In place of the supposedly too-theoretical scholarship the academy now 
produces, Posner would like to see more work that focuses on the practical 
operations of the (federal) judiciary. He provides twenty-one bullet points41 
that can be summarized as aiming at two goals: First, he wants academics to 
show that legal realism is correct, thus nudging his fellow judges away from 
formalism; and second, he wants academics to study judicial management 
defi ciencies, thus providing grounds for managerial reforms. The fi rst goal 
37. Posner fi rst ridicules Richard H. Fallon, Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories 
of Statutory Interpretation—And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 685 (2014). See POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 42-43. Although Posner 
says he does “not mean to criticize Professor Fallon,” id. at 43, it is diffi  cult to read him any 
other way. See id. (describing Fallon’s article as evidence that “academic law is becoming 
esoteric.”). Later, Posner dismisses another Fallon article. See id. at 319-20 (quoting Richard 
A. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015)). Once again, Posner purports to draw the sting, this time by calling 
him “a distinguished scholar.”
38. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 278. 
39. See Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, 
J.) (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1359–61 (2000)); Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(Posner, J.) (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003); American Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (citing Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 
92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra).
40. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 28, 380.
41. Id. at 364-66.
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is naïve, whereas the second goal is in tension with Posner’s chief reform 
proposal for law school curricula.
“Legal realism as a distinct school of judges and law professors,” Posner 
correctly notes, “fl ourished most outspokenly in the 1920s and 1930s, but there 
were realists before and realists after, and there are realists today.”42 In American 
law, one can fi nd precursors of legal realism in Justice Iredell’s concurrence in 
Calder v. Bull,43 a century later in the academic writings of Holmes,44 and in the 
more recent developments to which Posner adverts. Legal realist scholarship 
within the legal academy has tended to point to the gaps, contradictions, and 
ambiguities in formal legal materials. Karl Llewellyn’s pairing of canons of 
construction with their supposed opposites 45 is emblematic of this form of 
scholarship, as is Felix Cohen’s characterization of conceptual rather than 
functional analysis as “transcendental nonsense.”46 In recent decades, political 
scientists have added econometric analyses of data on judges and justices, case 
characteristics, and outcomes, all of which tend to confi rm Posner’s view that a 
judge’s priors play a very important role in the decision of contested appellate 
cases. 47
Posner does not address, much less answer, the question why, if this mountain 
of scholarship has not yet persuaded judges of the truth of legal realism, some 
more articles will. My view, as noted above, is that Posner understates the 
42. Id. at 78-79.
43. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting “natural 
justice” as too indeterminate a basis for grounding constitutional law).
44. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897) (“The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by the law.”).
45. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons of About How 
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
46. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
47. Just how important those priors are appears to be an open question. Lawrence Solum’s 
review of one of Posner’s recent co-authored books includes a useful summary of the 
development of the “attitudinal model,” which claims, based on regressions of databases of 
Supreme Court cases coded for legal and ideological inputs, that Supreme Court judging 
is essentially all ideology. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False 
Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2473 (2014) (reviewing EPSTEIN ET 
AL., supra note 5). Solum goes on to argue that the evidence adduced by Epstein, Landes, and 
Posner undermines the hypothesis that ideology alone drives judicial outcomes, even at the 
Supreme Court, see Solum, supra at 2487-88, because that evidence shows that distinctly legal 
preferences of judges also play a substantial role. Id. at 2489. Whether the empirical evidence 
proves that legal realism is correct thus depends on what legal realism (as a descriptive 
account of judging) is. If legal realism is the claim that judging is all ideology, it is clearly 
false. If legal realism is the claim that judging is not all formalism, then legal realism is 
clearly true. Solum concludes that the jury is out on where the activity of judging falls in 
between these two extremes, and on what normative implications follow from the answer to 
that empirical question. See id. at 2491-97. 
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degree to which judges currently are legal realists. Almost two decades ago, 
Brian Leiter deemed it already a cliché that “we are all realists now.”48
Posner does suggest that perhaps a diff erent methodology would work: 
Legal scholars should study how individual judges and courts as a whole 
actually go about their business. He off ers his own collaborations with other 
scholars as a model, identifying three projects: one with Lee Epstein and 
William Landes; a second with Mitu Gulati; and a third with Abbe Gluck.49 
All four are fi ne scholars, but, as Posner notes,50 both Epstein and Landes 
have doctorates in other fi elds (political science and economics, respectively), 
which tends to undermine Posner’s complaint elsewhere in the book that 
the population of law faculties with “refugees from other disciplines” drives 
the academy further from the bench.51 To be sure, Gulati and Gluck are (like 
Posner and me) just lawyers, but the work he is doing with them is more in 
the nature of sociology than of law. It is a tribute to their talents that they 
can do good work using methodologies for which they lack formal training,52 
but to the extent that Posner thinks that the most useful work to be done by 
legal scholars is empirical study of the judiciary, that argues for more rather 
than fewer law professors with advanced degrees in other fi elds—especially 
econometrics, sociology, and management science.
We should therefore assume that, despite Posner’s contention that most 
law professors with doctorates in other fi elds are simply failures in those other 
fi elds,53 he really would like to see a multiplication of dual-degree faculty. 
But that logical implication of Posner’s proposed reforms in the scholarship 
law faculty produce is at odds with his proposed reforms of the law school 
curriculum.
Echoing calls from the bar, Posner advocates more practical education. 
Based partly on his own experience, he would like to see civil procedure and 
evidence taught as “clinical”54 or, more accurately, what he calls “mock clinical” 
48. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 
(1997). See also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 229 (1986). 
49. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 286.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 9.
52. I have also dabbled in social science using the sort of methodology Posner uses in the studies 
to which he refers, albeit in collaboration with scholars who are trained in such methods. 
See Michael C. Dorf and Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory Countermovement 
Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 449 (2014) (reporting 
results of interviews with LGBT rights lawyers); Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, Drug 
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) (reporting 
observations of drug treatment courts and results of interviews with drug treatment court 
personnel).
53. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 9 (describing the modern legal academy as “the 
safe berth for the philosopher manqué, the historian manqué, and so on.”).
54. Id. at 323, 344, 347.
196 Journal of Legal Education
or “quasi-clinical”55 courses, by which he means what is usually conveyed by 
the term “simulation” courses. Posner also would like to see the clinical faculty 
given tenure and more closely integrated into the rest of the faculty.56
These are hardly radical ideas, and they have been successfully implemented 
to varying degrees at many law schools. But they do raise cost questions. 
Clinical and simulation courses are more labor-intensive than Socratic or 
lecture courses, typically requiring higher faculty-student ratios. Even if the 
faculty members teaching the added skills are not also pursuing research into 
how judges decide cases and otherwise trying to provide useful information to 
the federal judiciary—as Posner wants—the shift in teaching method would lead 
to an increase in faculty size. Yet Posner disapproves of the recent “essentially 
mindless expansion in the size of the legal professoriate . . . .”57 Perhaps he 
thinks the expansion to which his proposal would lead would be “mindful,” 
but it would still be costly.
Posner does have some good ideas about legal education, but even these 
seem half-baked. For example, he persuasively argues that a good lawyer should 
be literate in both the humanities and the sciences. Thus, he proposes that law 
students who arrive with a humanities background take undergraduate courses 
in technical subjects, while those who arrive with a technical background be 
required to take humanities courses in law school.58 The goal is sensible, but 
the means are odd. Law schools are already under pressure to add more skills 
courses, leaving little room to require (admittedly vital) courses outside the 
law entirely. Requiring undergraduate prerequisites for law school, in the way 
that medical schools do, might better serve Posner’s aims.
In some respects, Posner is badly out of touch with how legal education 
actually proceeds. His views about legal writing instruction are especially 
misinformed. Posner asserts that fi rst-year required legal writing courses 
teach students to use jargon,59 which is a calumny. Any survey of legal writing 
instructors will verify that they teach students not to use jargon,60 as the title 
55. Id. at 324.
56. See id. at 325 (“A further problem is that many, perhaps most, clinical law professors do not 
receive tenure, are not expected to publish, and do not do much teaching in the conventional 
sense.”).
57. Id. at 13-14.
58. Id. at 325-26.
59. Id. at 336.
60.  I asked my Cornell Law School colleagues who teach fi rst-year Lawyering (our legal writing 
course) whether they instruct students to use jargon. They all said no; they teach students 
to avoid jargon. I also asked whether they know of any reputable legal writing program 
anywhere that teaches students to use jargon. Again, they all said no. Posner has also taken 
issue with judges using legal jargon. See United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395, 407-08 
(7th Cir., 2016) (Posner, J., concurring) (“Judicial opinions are littered with stale, opaque, 
confusing jargon. There is no need for jargon, stale or fresh. Everything judges do can be 
explained in straightforward language—and should be.”).
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of a textbook used in many such courses confi rms.61 Posner also dislikes such 
“mechanical” systems for brief or memorandum writing as “IRAC” (Issue, 
Rule, Application, Conclusion) and “CRAC” (Conclusion, Rule, Application, 
Conclusion).62 He is right that student writing that rigidly uses either of these 
formats lacks elegance, but he misunderstands their purpose. Many students 
arrive in law school unfamiliar with the logical structure of analytical and 
persuasive writing. Systems like IRAC and CRAC provide them with a means 
of compiling the necessary elements of an argument. Once students master 
these basics, they learn to use the outlining systems implicitly. As they gain 
confi dence, they take poetic license, and their writing begins to fl ow. Posner is 
correct that many students and lawyers never become great or even competent 
writers, but that is not because they have been straitjacketed by IRAC, CRAC, 
or, more generally, the instruction they receive in legal writing courses. 
IV
Posner’s most basic proposal for reforming legal education resonates with his 
view of judging and scholarship: He wants law schools to teach students to be 
legal realists.63 He states that “[l]aw students are natural formalists,”64 and that 
they remain so even though “a great many law professors” are legal realists.65 
For generations, professors have used the Socratic method to demonstrate to 
students that the seemingly determinate law is largely indeterminate, at least at 
the margins, which is where appellate cases fall. Yet students remain attached 
to formalism.66 Just as Posner does not explain how, after over a century of 
legal scholarship, more such scholarship will persuade judges to embrace legal 
realism (to a greater extent than they already do), he does not explain how 
more legal realist teaching will persuade law students (and the lawyers they 
become) to embrace legal realism.
To solve the puzzle would require an account of the attraction of formalism. 
For students in particular, part of the answer may be careerism. Students 
understandably seek good grades as a pathway to good jobs, and they think that 
the path to good grades runs through correct answers. The satellite industry of 
hornbooks and commercial outlines reinforces this quest for certainty.
But careerism is at best an incomplete explanation. Many students come to 
law school after undergraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, 
where they have grown comfortable with the idea that hard questions do not 
61. BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISh (2d ed. 2013).
62. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHWAYS, supra note 6, at 336.
63. Id. at 366.
64. Id. at 302.
65. Id. at 300.
66. See Michael C. Dorf, Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 930 n.210 
(2003) (“In my experience, students arrive at law school as naïve formalists. Much of their 
legal education aims to convert them into cynical legal realists, but the process does not 
take.”).
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yield clear answers. The formalism that most law students bring to their legal 
studies resembles the formalism of the broader public. Where does that come 
from?
Maybe the answer is politics. As Posner notes, neoformalism in federal 
constitutional and statutory cases is largely a product of the Federalist Society 
and the judges and justices appointed to the bench by Republican presidents 
beginning with Ronald Reagan.67 With the recent death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia and the possibility that a Democratic president will name his successor, 
perhaps originalism and formalism more generally will fade away.68
Posner’s own analysis suggests, however, that formalism will not disappear 
entirely. He thinks formalism is not simply a project of the political right but a 
product of the legal profession’s failings. He says the belief that authoritative 
rules fi ltered through legal jargon and the “faux rigor” of lawyers’ “obsession 
with citation format” will yield determinate results answers an “anxiety” 
created by the fact “that law really is not a rigorous fi eld.”69 More insidiously, 
by mystifying the law, lawyers perpetuate a “guild” that is able to extract 
undeserved rents from the nonlawyer population.70
Posner’s idea that lawyers generate needless complexity to con the public 
is not new. Jerome Frank’s 1930 classic legal realist book, Law and the Modern 
Mind, made the same point, but Frank, unlike Posner, attributed the view that 
legal complexity is a scam to the naïveté of most nonlawyers, who believe that 
were it not for lawyers’ “craftiness and guile, the law could be clear, exact and 
certain.”71 Like Frank and other legal realists who preceded him, Posner thinks 
the law is almost never clear, exact, and certain. But Frank exculpated lawyers. 
They are not deliberately deceiving the public to extract rents. Even lawyers 
themselves, Frank explained, “fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic and 
mutable character of law.”72
Posner, by contrast, holds the negative view about lawyers that Frank 
attributed to naïve formalists—that lawyers are scammers. In order for that 
charge to be true, however, lawyers would have to know better. They would 
have to be closet legal realists who only feign formalism. Posner does think 
some of his fellow judges are indeed closet legal realists; yet he does not think 
this about most practicing lawyers. He thinks most lawyers, like most law 
students, are actually formalists. But if so, they should at least be acquitted of 
the charge of lying to the public.
67. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHWAYS, supra note 6, at 87.
68. See Eric Posner, Why Originalism Will Fade, ERIC POSNER (Feb. 18, 2016), http://ericposner.com/
why-originalism-will-fade/.
69. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 128
70. Id. at 301. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 39-70 (1995) (comparing the 
evolution since the 1960s of the modern legal profession’s “cartel” to the transformation 
from medieval guilds to mass production).
71. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 5 (Transaction Publishers 2009) (1930).
72. Id. at 10.
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The conclusion that lawyers are naïfs but not con artists is admittedly faint 
praise for the legal profession; but if Posner were to draw it, he would leave 
room for his project of educating law students, lawyers, and judges in the truth 
of legal realism—at least in theory. But probably not in practice. Given the 
failure of other eff orts in that direction, Posner too will almost surely fail to 
vanquish formalism completely. What should we make of that failure?
The answer depends on why even people who know better believe in 
formalism despite the evidence against it. The simplest answer is that they 
don’t. Even if we are not all legal realists to the extent that Posner is, maybe 
nearly everybody with any real knowledge of how the legal system operates 
understands that the formal legal materials frequently leave gaps for appellate 
courts to fi ll. If so, then the question is narrower. It is not why are lawyers formalists? 
but why are lawyers more formalist than seems warranted? Seen in this way, the legal 
profession’s failure to join Posner as full-on legal realists is only partial. We are 
now asking why formalism has even the residual hold that it does.
Perhaps belief in formalism is like religious belief. We have been 
indoctrinated in it, and it serves important psychological needs. If belief in 
formalism has this character, then, by Posner’s own reasoning, it will remain 
stubbornly impervious to being dislodged by rational argument. Posner says 
in Divergent Paths that rational arguments about abortion go nowhere “because 
the antagonists argue not from shared premises but from incommensurable 
political, moral, or (in the abortion case) religious beliefs (or lack thereof). . . .”73 
Elsewhere, Posner has tried to cabin his claims about the limitations of reason 
for resolving moral propositions,74 but belief in formalism probably should 
count as a moral belief in the sense that Posner uses the term.
And rightly so. Everyone is a formalist at least to the extent that he or she 
thinks that in a great many circumstances, the combination of authoritative 
text and social convention provides reasonably clear answers to a great many 
questions that, absent clear law, would lead to confl ict. How old must one be 
in the state of Illinois to purchase alcohol? What is the statute of limitations for 
the federal crime of mail fraud? When does a president’s term start? Et cetera. 
Formalism—understood in this minimal sense—is a moral principle roughly 
synonymous with belief in the rule of law.
Posner does not deny that easy cases exist. On the contrary, he attacks 
critical legal studies for extending the legal realist critique of the determinacy 
of formal legal materials beyond the domain wher e that critique has real 
force—in appellate cases.75 Yet Posner does not explore the implications of his 
tacit acceptance of the fact that there is a domain of formalism and a domain of 
legal realism. Posner’s dismissal of all philosophizing leaves him uninterested 
in an important puzzle: What happens at the boundary between easy cases 
and hard cases?
73. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 29.
74. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
75. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 263-64.
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That is arguably the central question of modern jurisprudence. To 
oversimplify greatly, Ronald Dworkin argued that there is no boundary—that 
in hard cases judges properly employ the same methodology as they employ 
in easy cases. Dworkin thought that in hard cases a judge seeks to synthesize 
the existing legal materials by reference to principles of political morality. 
Although Dworkin thought that there are right answers to moral questions,76 
he was not a formalist, because he recognized that in a pluralistic society, 
judges with diff erent values will reach diff erent conclusions about what those 
right answers are.77 H.L.A. Hart thought that Dworkin’s view was still too 
formalist. Hart thought that hard cases arise in areas where the law has an 
“open texture,” and that judges exercise discretion in deciding such cases. 78
Posner blithely dismisses both Dworkin and Hart as irrelevant to judges.79 
Yet his own view is quite close to Hart’s, even echoing Hart’s language. When 
Posner refers to the law’s “open area”80 he means just what Hart meant by 
“open texture.”81 By failing to see the similarity between Hart’s views and his 
own, Posner misses an opportunity to exploit his main competitive advantage—
his ability to describe judging from the inside.
Posner uses a number of diff erent terms to describe how a judge decides 
a case in the open area of the law. The judge falls back on his “priors”;82 he 
focuses on “practical consequences”;83 he relies on “the personal, the emotional, 
and the intuitive,” terms he that he equates with “moral intuition.”84 These 
various formulations are not synonyms, and they are at best vague. A recently 
discovered previously unpublished manuscript on discretion by Hart shows 
that it is possible to say something informative about discretionary decisions.85 
To say that a judge exercises discretion should not be a showstopper.
76. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996) 
(defending the concept of moral truth).
77. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 37 (1996) (“the moral reading encourages lawyers and 
judges to read an abstract constitution in the light of what they take to be justice.”).
78. In the postscript to his best-known work, Hart remarked that Dworkin’s account of the 
role of law, rather than discretion, in deciding appellate cases took too seriously “the ritual 
language used by judges and lawyers.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 274 (2d ed. 1994).
79. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 277 (judges “do not read H. L. A. Hart or Ronald 
Dworkin”); id. at 221 n.26 (“Hart’s book is revered; I wish I knew why.”).
80. Id. at 22, 176-180, 352.
81. HART, supra note 78, at 128.
82. Id. at 22.
83. Id. at 176.
84. Id. at 180.
85. See H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652 (2013). The essay was written and 
distributed among Harvard Law School faculty when Hart was a visiting professor there in 
1956, but was not published during his lifetime and was thought to be lost. See Geoff rey C. 
Shaw, H.L.A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV. L. REV. 666, 
666-70 (2013).
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What we need are a good normative account of what judges should do when 
fi lling in the open spaces of the law and a good descriptive account of what 
they actually do when faced with that task. The best parts of Divergent Paths aim 
at these goals, but too much of the book, indeed, too much of Posner’s recent 
academic work overall, either simply insists or attempts to establish that large 
open spaces exist—that is, that legal realism is correct.
That is not helpful. The people who stubbornly remain residual formalists 
or (more rarely) complete formalists after over a century of realist writing from 
some of the greatest legal minds are not amenable to persuasion. The rest 
of us agree with Posner that appellate judging mostly involves the fi lling in 
of the law’s open areas. The collaborative project Posner has undertaken to 
survey his fellow judges suggests that Posner himself recognizes the need for 
a thicker description of judging. I hope Posner’s next book will say less about 
the existence of law’s open areas and more about how judges can and should 
fi ll them in.
V
Given Posner’s prolifi city, we will not need to wait long for that next book, 
but perhaps we should not wait at all. Posner is, after all, not just a public 
intellectual. He is also a judge, and in that capacity he makes the best argument 
for his view of the judicial role. Posner’s opinions color within the lines of the 
law, even while they accomplish what he complains that a CRAC-addicted 
student cannot: They persuasively resolve hard questions by focusing on the 
real stakes.
His opinion striking down the same-sex marriage bans of Indiana and 
Wisconsin86 showed Posner at his best. The opinion fi t the existing Supreme 
Court precedent, even as it quickly moved to ask, in good pragmatic fashion, 
what the point of these laws was. By 2014, when the case was argued and 
decided, both the culture and equal protection doctrine forbade the 
laws’ proponents from invoking their real reason for support: religiously 
motivated homophobia. Thus, the state was left to argue that the bans were 
somehow designed to protect the children born as the accidental product of 
heterosexual sex. Posner wryly responded: “Heterosexuals get drunk and 
pregnant, producing unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed to 
marry. Homosexual couples do not produce unwanted children; their reward 
is to be denied the right to marry. Go fi gure.”87 Posner calmly explained that 
the state’s argument was backward, because married same-sex couples provide 
stable homes for the accidentally produced children they adopt.88 His opinion 
striking down Wisconsin’s law requiring doctors performing abortions to have 
admitting privileges in nearby hospitals was equally forthright in surveying 
the background circumstances of the law’s adoption to reach the unassailable 
86. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
87. Id. at 662.
88. See id. at 662-64.
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conclusion that the law’s purpose was to make abortions more diffi  cult to 
obtain, not to make them safer.89
Posner’s opinions make for refreshing reading. They show that it is possible 
to be a pragmatic judge—and an entertaining one at that—even while operating 
within the law’s conventions.

Divergent Paths exemplifi es its own thesis. It is a work of legal scholarship 
that does not provide the judiciary with the help that Posner thinks it needs. 
Fortunately, his own work on the bench largely does. The best hope for 
further erosion of formalism and movement toward Posner-style pragmatic 
jurisprudence may come from the example Posner himself sets as a judge.
89. See Planned Parenthood of Wisc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (2015).
